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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right pursuant to Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Rule 3(a) & 4(a)t from summary judgment granted by the 
district court and poured over from the Utah Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I 
Whether a jury trial may be denied by summary judgment granted upon 
pivotal findings of fact inferred from a hearsay included in a 
supporting affidavit contrary to URE 802, 803 (1), URCP 56 (e), 43 (a) 
& (b), and rebutted by pleadings, motions, affidavits and exhibits 
interpreted in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, 
Sellers. 
II 
Whether typed-in alterations or additional contradictions in a form 
contract supercede and vitiate pre-printed form language warranties 
contained in fine print on the back of the contract, rendering the 
printed terms ambiguous and suceptible to construction of the 
contractual terms against Buyers/drafters. 
Ill 
Whether the damages awarded for breach of warranty should be assessed 
in an amount to compensate for losses regarding the benefit of the 
bargain or should be assessed in the full amount of the price of a new 
device. 
IV 
Whether Sellers' Counsel may be punished as acting in bad faith for 
asserting Sellers' right to object to Buyers' attorney's fees as 
unreasonable for services that did not advance the progress of Buyers' 
case toward a remedy, or which were in excess of a reasonable amount 
of time necessary to provide services for the amount in dispute. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case upon a form contract for the purchase of existing 
residential realty brought by Appellee alleging an express warranty 
and a breach. 
About ten days after Appellants' answer to the complaint was 
filed, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment before any formal 
discovery was completed. A hearing on the motion was held and the 
final orders/judgments in this case were entered on or about 21 
September 1992 granting summary judgment, attorney fees, costs and 
sanctions. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed and served on or about 16 October 
1992. 
iv 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants sold existing residential real property to Appellees 
pursuant to a written form contract presented by Appellees. (Record -
Agreement, pp 36-40). 
Appellees had a professional inspect the property a short time 
before the closing and approved its condition. Appellees claim five 
days after the closing the heating system was defective. Appellees 
waited about thirty days and hired legal counsel who gave notice of 
the alleged defect and claimed a warranty existed. Appellees recovered 
the fee they paid their inspector and demanded a new furnace and 
attorney fees under the contract from Appellants. Appelles filed suit 
during negotiations. (R - Affidavit, p 64, para 9 & pp 63-85), 
Appellants hired counsel and answered that written-in contract 
terms repudiated a warranty and the house was sold subject only to 
Appellees' approval. (R - Answer, pp 10-15). Appellants still offered 
to repair the furnace, replace it with a used furnace and offered to 
pay half the value of a new furnace less the fee recovered. Appellees 
refused, still demanding the price of an installed new furnace and 
attorney fees as damages. (R -pp 79,80 & 84, Sellers Affidavit, Ex B). 
Ten days after Appellants answered the complaint Appellees filed a 
motion for summary judgment, costs, attorney fees and later moved for 
sanctions when Appellants objected to the Appellees statement of 
attorney fees as unreasonable. A hearing was held on the motion for 
summary judgment. (R -Answer, pp 10-15; Motion, pp 21-22). 
A final order entered granting the relief Appellees sought in toto 
and this was noticed to Appellants' Counsel, initiating this appeal. 
(R -pp 140-142, Order & Certification). 
v 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, "Sellers," sold a residential real property to 
Appellees, "Buyers", pursuant to a form contract, Sales Agreement, 
drafted by Appellees. (R - Agreement, pp 36-40). 
Buyers hired a professional inspector to exercise their right 
under the Agreement to inspect the house, including the heating 
system. Buyers' inspector completed the inspection a short time before 
the 15 April 1991 closing and found no defects. (R - pp 11, Sellers' 
Answer, para 8-9 & pp 64 -Affidavit, Averment 9). Buyers approved of 
the condition of the property and closed. Shortly after closing, 
Buyers communicated a number of concerns to Sellers regarding the 
house. Sellers forthwith amicably resolved Buyers' inquiries. None of 
these inquiries concerned the heating system. (R -p 64, Affidavit, 
Averments 13-15 & pp 75-76, Ex A). 
Buyers claimed a crack in the furnace existed five days after the 
closing, rendering it in unsatisfactory working condition. About 
thirty days after Buyers alleged they became aware of a problem with 
the furnace, they hired legal counsel, who notified Sellers. (R -p 77, 
Sellers' Affidavit, Ex A-10). Buyers asserted a warranty and then 
demanded installation of a new furnace and attorney fees under General 
Provisions C and N of the Agreement. Sellers attempted to gather 
information concerning the purported defect. (R -p 73, Sellers' 
Affidavit, Ex A-7). Sellers wrote to Buyers' attorney that Buyers' 
agent/inspector admitted he had found the furnace in average working 
condition before the closing. (R -p 70 & 66, Sellers' Affidavit, Ex 
A-1&5).Buyers did not respond, but filed suit in the district court 
for the value of a new furnace instead.(R -p3 Complaint, para 9 & 16). 
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Sellers retained legal counsel and answered that the furnace was 
in satisfactory working condition at the closing, that written terms 
of condition 1 (e) of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement and other 
clauses expressly repudiated warranties, and that Buyers accepted the 
house after the inspection. Trial by jury was demanded. (R -pp 10-13, 
Sellers* Answer). 
Sellers offered to repair the purported defect as an Offer of 
Judgment. (R -p 16). This was refused. Sellers then offered to replace 
the furnace with a used furnace. (R -pp 18, 19, 79, 80 & 84, Sellers 
Affidavit, Ex B). This was refused, purportedly upon the hearsay 
opinion of un-named declarants whose affidavits were not proffered. (R 
-p 46, Buyers' Affidavit, Averment 18.) Sellers then made an offer of 
judgment for the estimated value of an operational used furnace, half 
the price of an installed new furnace less the fee Buyers recovered 
from the inspector who approved the furnace. (R -pp 79, 80 & 84, 
Sellers Affidavit, Ex B). Buyers still demanded the full price of a 
new installed furnace and attorney fees. 
Buyers filed a motion for summary judgment before any discovery 
was completed. (R - p 21-22). Buyers' supporting affidavit swore that, 
five days after the closing, the affiant Buyer had heard another say 
that a crack in the furnace existed and other unsubstantiated 
statements. (R -p 43). Sellers filed a Response objecting to the 
inclusion of hearsay in the Buyer's affidavit. (R -p 60). Trans 
3/2/92, p 10, 11 15-17. Sellers' counter-affidavit rebutted the 
hearsay about the furnace according to the URE 801(d)(2) 
admission of the Buyers' agent/inspector that the furnace was in 
satisfactory condition prior to the sale. Sellers' affidavit directly 
rebutted Buyers' complaint of breach of warranty and averred the 
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satisfactory working condition of the furnace on the day of the 
closing and the safe and uneventful operation of the furnace since 
1983. (R - p 64, Sellers' Affidavit, Averments 10-12). 
Sellers responded at the URCP 56 hearing that the Agreement was 
ambiguous and should be construed against the Buyers, drafters, to 
except a warranty especially upon the typed and written-in terms 
within four corners of the Agreement 1(e), 7 and the counter-offer. 
Trans, pp 13-15. Sellers asserted Buyers accepted the contractual 
condition of an inspection to assess the fitness of the house, 
excepting any warranty. Sellers argued below that should warranties be 
found, notwithstanding the written-in intention to except them, 
pursuant to General Provision C, the application of warranties is 
expressly limited to the time "at closing." Buyers countered that 
warranties were effective for an indefinite period beyond the closing 
pursuant to General Provision O, which abrogated the Agreement upon 
closing except for those extended by express warranty. 
Sellers additionally asserted below that Buyers* affidavit was 
legally insufficient and summary judgment was inappropriate since 
Buyers* affidavit relied upon self-serving hearsay as to what a 
nameless declarant purportedly said concerning the heating system 
(Agreement, 9) five days after the Buyers took possession of the 
property . Trans pp 10, 11 11-25 - pp 12, 11 1-12. The hearsay was 
inadmissable regarding the pivotal fact of whether the furnace was in 
satsfactory working condition at the closing. 
Buyers asserted the hearsay of the nameless declarant was excepted 
from the hearsay rule as a "present sense impression". Buyers* 
affidavit did not foundationally establish that the utterance was made 
spontaneously while the declarant was witnessing any purported 
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splitting in the furnace seam, or whether the condition was observed 
before the closing* (R - pp 44 & 45, Buyers' Affidavit, Averments 7 & 
12 vis-a-vis Sellers' Affidavit, pp 73, 68, 66 & 71, para 2 "at 
closing." ) 
Buyers submitted a Statement of Fees (R -p 111) that showed the 
declarant from Mountain Fuel would provide no affidavit corroborating 
the hearsay proffered by Buyers as that of this un-named declarant. 
This hearsay was contradicted by admission of Buyers' agent/inspector. 
(R -p64, Averment 9 & p 66, Ex A-l). Sellers argued Buyers did not 
satisfy their burden to show by admissable evidence that the furnace 
was irreparable or whether a crack existed at closing to breach the 
alleged warranty. These genuine questions of fact to be decided by the 
jury, were found against Sellers upon motion for summary judgment. 
Sellers averred Buyers bought an existing house and plead that 
awarding damages at the full amount of a new furnace was erroneous. (R 
-p 11, Answer, para 9). It was never averred by Buyers that the parties 
contemplated the bargain included a new furnace in the used house. 
Inference from the affidavits and pleadings drawn in favor of the 
Sellers, non-moving parties, was that Buyers knew, or should have 
known through their agent/inspector, before closing that the furnace 
was used. Buyers did not show damages with any degree of certainty as 
to the value of the benefit of the bargain lost, a satisfactory used 
furnace. Buyers failed or refused to proffer a paid receipt or 
cancelled check evidencing the amount paid for the new furnace. (Trans 
-p 30, 11 16-25 - p 31, 11 1-13). 
After the dispositive motion was heard, finalization of the 
judgment was held under advisement pending the submission and review 
of an itemized statement of services and attorney fees. 
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The district court initially stated it was struck that the amount 
of attorney fees demanded was high given the amount in dispute and 
offered Sellers the opportunity to object upon receipt of the itemized 
Statement of the Fees. Trans 3/2/92 p 30, 11 1-9. 
General Provision N provided a reasonable attorney's fee may be 
granted when arising or accruing from enforcement of the Agreement or 
pursuing any remedy. Sellers' Response to Motion for fees and 
Objection (5/8/92) objected to the unreasonability of Buyers' demand 
for fees, since Buyers reasonably could have contacted Sellers first 
rather than waiting thirty days, hiring an attorney, demanding a brand 
new furnace for which Buyers never bargained and filing suit while 
negotiations were ongoing. (R -p 119, 133 & 60). Sellers argued a 
remedy could have been obtained without such needless expense. (R -p 
62, Sellers' Response, para 8; p 64, Sellers' Affidavit, Averments 
13-22; p 120, Sellers' Objection (1/10/92), para 6). 
Buyers acknowledged Sellers "have a right to review and question 
fees ..." (R- p 133, Reply to Sellers' Response to Sanctions). The 
Sellers' Response to Motion for fees and Objection questioned those 
fees and cited case law to support the objection since the issue of 
the reasonability of fees demanded is always relevant. (R -p 122-125). 
Notwithstanding the district court's initial opinion about the 
demand for attorney fees being high and Buyers' concession that 
Sellers had the right to question the fees, the district court 
punished Sellers' Counsel pursuant to URCP 11 for objecting to the 
amount of attorney fees sought. Trans, p 30, 11 1-13. The final order 
entered as an integral condition to be incorporated into the summary 
judgment. Notice of entry was served on Appellants' Counsel and this 
appeal was filed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
A jury trial should not been denied by a summary judgment granted 
upon hearsay, included in a supporting affidavit contrary to URE 802, 
803 (l)f URCP 56 (e), 43 (a) & (b), th*t is rebutted by pleadings, 
motions, affidavits and exhibits interpreted in a light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, Sellers. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the lower court has granted a motion for summary judgment as to 
the claims of the moving party, the appellate court engages in de novo 
review, since the matter below is constrained to be determined solely 
as a matter of law. No deference is extended the lower court's legal 
conclusions upon review for correctness. Blue Cross v State, 779 
P2d 634 (Ut 1989). De novo review subsumes the application of the 
same standard of review required initially in the lower court. Durham 
v Margetts, 571 P2d 1332 (Ut 1977). The facts presented and all 
inferences arising therefrom are to be re-apprised in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, Sellers, since the lower court must 
refrain from weighing disputed facts and any doubt concerning factual 
questions must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. 1 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
APPLICABLE LAW 
URCP 43 (a) provides Sellers the right to demand a jury trial so 
admissable evidence may be considered, and factual inferences may be 
drawn, by jurors. This right subsumes cross-examination of witnesses 
against a party to test credibility and reliability according to 
rudimentary principles of due process. URE 806. Contrary to the 
general rule granting a trial, evidence on motions may be presented by 
affidavit if an exception exists in the URCP, URE, or statutes of the 
1. Morris v Farnsforth Motel, 123 Ut 289; 259 P2d 297 (Ut 1953), 
Beehive Brick v Robinson Brick, 780 P2d 827 (Ut App 1989), 
Winegar v Froerer, 813 P2d 104 (Ut 1991). 
State and the terms of the exception are satisfied. URCP 43(a) & (b). 
Buyers filed a supporting affidavit with a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to URCP 56. Sellers filed a rebutting affidavit. 
URCP 56 (e) states the requirements for affidavits supporting 
motions for summary judgment that permit undisputed evidence to be 
received without a trial and mandates in pertinent part: 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissable in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith ... (Emphasis Added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court held affidavits relying upon hearsay are 
prohibited and insufficient to support summary judgment, since they 
are inherently lacking indicia of reliability and credibility. 2 
Likewise affidavits lacking personal observation or independent 
knowledge, lacking a showing of competence of the affiant to testify 
as to the facts asserted, or made upon opinion and unsubstantiated 
belief are inadmissable, insufficient and precluded by law. 3 
Buyers submitted inadmissable statements below by arguing that the 
unsworn, out-of-court statements of an un-named declarant who 
purportedly worked for Mountain Fuel Supply Company was a URE 803(1) 
"present sense impression" exception to URE 802. URE 802 prohibits 
hearsay as inadmissable to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
2. URE 802, 803 (1), URCP 56 (g), Western States Thrift v 
Blomquist, 29 Ut2d 58, 504 P2d 1019 (Ut 1972), Preston v Lamb, 20 
Ut2d 260; 436 P2d 1021 (Ut 1968). 
3. Treloggan v Treloggan, 699 P2d 747 (Ut 1985), Strange v 
Ostlund, 594 P2d 877 (Ut 1979). 
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The URE 803(1) exception to the general rule, that hearsay is 
inadmissable, states in pertinent part: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or 
explaining the event or condition made while the declarant 
was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter. Emphasis Added. 
The URE 803(1) exception to URE 802 inadmissability on which 
Buyers rely is derived from the former Rule of Evidence 63 (4)(a) "res 
geste exception." This rule permits admission of hearsay only if the 
statement was uttered spontaneously while the declarant was perceiving 
the occurence of the event or condition described or shortly 
thereafter to assure that the declarant was so a part of the 
experience as to assure reliability by negating that the statement 
resulted from fabrication, intervening actions, or reflection. 4 
Buyers' reliance on URE 803(1) falls far short of the Beck test. 
Beck in pertinent part requires declarants statement (2) not be a 
mere narrative about a past completed affair, (3) not be a mere 
statement of opinion, (4) be a spontaneous utterance evoked by the 
occurence itself and not be a product of premeditation, reflection, or 
design, (5) while not being coincident or contemporaneous with the 
occurence of the event, it must be made at such time and under such 
circumstances as will exclude the presumption that it is the result of 
deliberation, (6) and must be made by one who witnessed the act. 
The statement must be so directly impelled by the happening of the 
thing as to be reflexively part of the occurence described to assure 
spontaneity and obviate reflection. McCandless, supra, p 618. 
T. State v McMillan, 588 P2d 162 (Ut 1978) which cited with 
approval in its holding Johnston v Ohis, 76 Wash2d 398; 457 P2d 
194, 199 (1969) which relied on Robbins v Green, 43 Wash2d 315; 
261 P2d 83, 86 and McCandless v Inland Northwest Film Serv, 64 
Wash2d 523; 392 P2d 613, 618-619 both of which relied of the six 
point test established in Beck v Dye, 200 Wash 1; 92 P2d 1113, 
1117; 127 ALR 1022 (Wash 1939). 
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Since a motion for summary judgment may have the effect of 
depriving the non-moving party of a jury trial and cross-examination 
under oath of opposing witnesses, the facts presented in the 
affidavits, depositions, pleadings, admissions and the inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom must be considered in a light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, and the moving party must clearly establish that 
all reasonable possibility that the non-moving party could win at 
trial is precluded or it is admitted. 5 Hearsay is insufficient 
and disfavored* 
Granting summary judgment is improper and should be denied when a 
dispute remains regarding a material fact even if only one sworn 
statement in a counter-affidavit or pleading presents a dispute, since 
an issue of fact is created that must be resolved at trial. 6 
The general rule is that a motion for summary judgment should not 
ben granted until discovery is complete. Downtown Athletic Club v 
Horman, 740 P2d 275 (Ut App 1987), cert den 765 P2d 1277. 
DISCUSSION 
An ultimate issue and pivotal factual question in this case turns 
on when, if at all, the purported parting or "cracking" of the furnace 
occurred. The unsworn, un-named Mountain Fuel employee, to which 
Buyers attribute outcome determinative hearsay, did not witness the 
act. Buyers* affidavit does not swear that the hearsay opined was 
evoked upon participating in, or witnessing, the alleged parting of 
5T URCP 56 (c), URE 806, Beehive Brick v Robinson Brick, 780 P2d 
827 (Ut CA 1989), Frederick May v Dunn, 13 Ut2d 40; 368 P2d 266 
(1962), Sorenson v Beers, 585 P2d 458 (Ut 1978), Synder v 
Merkley, 693 P2d 64 (Ut 1984), Estate Landscape v Mtn States Tel, 
793 P2d 415 (Ut CA 1990), SLC Corp v James Constr, 761 P2d 42 
(Ut CA 1988), Morris v Farnsforth Motel, 123 Ut 289, 259 P2d 297 
(Ut 1953). 
6. Brown Realty v Abbott, 562 P2d 238 (Ut 1977), Young v 
Frelornia, 121 Ut 646; 244 P2d 682 (Ut 1952), cert den 344 US 886; 
73 S Ct 186; 97 LEd 685, Holbrook Co v Adams, 542 P2d 191(Ut 1975) 
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the seam contrary to Beck. Buyer/affiant swears only that he was a 
witness to declarant's opinion made merely upon a later observation of 
a purported result on or about 20 April 1991 regarding a past or 
completed event. (R -p 44, Buyers' Aff, Aver 7.) This hearsay plainly 
fails the Beck test and is inadmissable. 
Simply, the URE 803(1) exception to inadmissability is not 
effective if the declarant is not a bystander who witnesses the 
occurence of the event that stimulates the declarant to reflexively 
make a spontaneous statement about the act observed. The hearsay of 
Buyers' declarants does not qualify because they made no spontaneous 
statement while observing the occurence of the split. Present sense 
impressions are a limited exception, not the rule. 
Buyers' proffer of hearsay in their affidavit is equivalent to 
admitting into evidence statements of a person who happened by the 
scene of an auto accident an indeterminate period of time after the 
alleged event occurred and allowing that person's hearsay to establish 
how or at what time the accident occurred and who was at fault, all 
without any foundation to qualify the person as an expert. 
Buyers offer the declarant as a psuedo expert, a Mountain Fuel 
employee, without any foundation concerning qualifications of the 
declarant to render opinion hearsay. This violates URE 702. The 
Affidavit of Buyers' attorney and Statement of Attorney Fees, 
10/23/91, 10/24/91, 10/28/91, filed below show Mountain Fuel and its 
counsel were conferred with by Buyers' counsel but declarant's sworn 
affidavit was not forthcoming. This refusal provides an inference, 
reasonably drawn in favor of the non-moving parties, that declarant 
was unwilling to corroborate the hearsay Buyers' affidavit avers 
either because declarant did not say what Buyers aver or he recants 
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the hearsay. Discovery could clarify these facts, but none was 
completed before Buyers filed the URCP 56 motion and no 
cross-examination was had at trial to demonstrate to the court the 
infirmity of Buyers9 case which is primarily dependent on hearsay. 
Beck is also instructive that the courts are especially 
reluctant to refrain from applying the inadmissability requirement of 
Rule 802 to present sense impression hearsay when the declarant is 
unidentified. Not only is the declarant herein un-named, but the 
witness/affiant is not the declarant, the witness/affiant obviously 
has a major self-serving interest in evading the hearsay rule, and the 
neither the witness/affiant nor the declarant are subject to 
confrontation or cross-examination to test the reliability of the 
hearsay in Buyers1 Affidavit. The declarant, who would not affix his or 
her signature on Exhibit B of Buyers' Affidavit was unsworn at the 
unspecified time and at the location where the hearsay was alleged to 
have been made. (R -p 54). 
The witness/affiants, Buyers, were not examined as to the 
circumstances under which the declarants offered the hearsay, as an 
aid in evaluating the credibility of the statements which are unfairly 
prejudicial to the non-moving party. Since the hearsay is more 
prejudicial than probative regarding when the alleged crack occurred 
it is excluded by URE 403, especially where such statements lack the 
indicia of credibility and reliability required by URCP 56(e). 
Likewise, Buyers' Exhibit B, unsworn and uncertified contrary to 
URCP 56(e)j is inadmissable under URE 803(6). Exhibit B does not 
substantiate the hearsay of the declarant about a "large split" or 
"the release of toxic gas" that Buyers offered the lower court for 
obvious effect. Sellers affidavit squarely rebuts this inflammatory 
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hearsay as did Buyers' inspector's admissions. (R -p 64, Sellers Aff, 
Averments 9-12 vis-a-vis Buyers' Aff, Averment 12 and Trans p 2, 11 8. 
The hearsay Notice, Buyers' Exhibit B, is inadmissable since it is 
unsworn by the declarant and uncertifed by a qualified record keeper 
contrary to URE 803(6) and URCP 56(e). It appears to contradict 
Buyers' assertion that the furnace was unconnected (R -p 44, Buyers' Aff, 
Averment 7) and the lower court's erroneous fact finding that the 
furnace needed to be hooked-up. Trans, p 29,11-12. Exhibit B comports 
with Agreement l(c)f indicating the gas was connnected,and states the 
furnace was shut off on 20 April 1992 for a reparable or correctable 
flame disturbance. The fact finding and inferences drawn in favor of 
the moving party were contrary to law and Buyers' Exhibit B. Trans 
3/2/92 - p 23-24. Why Buyers waited five days after the closing is 
unexplained, as is why Buyers waited thirty days to notice the 
purported defect through an attorney rather than directly calling upon 
Sellers to cure. 
When the facts before the lower court are viewed in a light most 
favorable to Sellers, the Notice of the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
prohibited by URCP 56 (e) and unsigned by the declarant, is directly 
rebutted by Sellers' Affidavit, Averment 10. Seller swears the gas was 
turned-off on the day of closing, 15 April 1992, not disconnected, and 
the furnace was in satisfactory working condition. (R -p 64). 
The inference to be drawn in favor of Sellers is that the defect, 
if any, occurred after the closing, or Buyers tampered with the 
furnace. There are genuine and critical issues of fact to be 
determined by the fact finder at trial. 
Similarly Buyers' Counsel proffered to the lower court hearsay 
alleged to have been made about September 1991, five months after the 
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closing and after Buyers filed suit. Counsel stated to the Court this 
inadmissable hearsay about the furnace was "verified." Trans, p 3, 11 
6-7. No affidavit from any of these declarants was submitted. The 
content of Buyers affidavit is devoid of a sworn statement that 
Buyers/affiants personally witnessed what they aver others observed. 
(R -p 46, Buyers Aff, Averments 16 -18). 
The reliance of Buyers' affidavit on inadmissable hearsay to 
create prejudicial inferences in favor of the moving party as if they 
were proof contravenes the protections intended by URE 802 and URCP 56 
(e)• Buyers' affidavit is devoid of averments of personal observation 
or independent knowledge of any crack, its length or location, or of 
being possessed of any competence to establish a foundation for their 
expertise to render an opinion on the reparability of the furnace or 
toxic fumes. To the contrary the affidavit is a plethora of 
self-serving, unreliable and inadmissable hearsay - "he explained, he 
said, we were told, we informed, she communicated, what others 
witnessed, we spoke, he stated, he recommended, having been told, etc" 
- mostly ascribed to un-named declarants who were not subject to oath. 
(R -p 44, Buyers Aff, Averments 7, 8, 12, 18, 19, 22, 10, 11, 13, 14 
and 24. 
At the hearing below, the lower court expressed knowledge of the 
need for compliance with the Rules of Evidence regarding motions for 
summary judgment, but erroneously applied a relaxed hearsay standard 
that is contrary to uniform application of that general rule required 
by URCP 56 (e) and enforced by Utah appellate courts as taught in 
Western States Thrift, Preston, Treloggan, and Strange cited above. 
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When Sellers' Counsel attempted to clarify in the record for the 
lower court why each of the evidentiary infirmities in the affidavit 
were inadmissable, the court advised it had already ruled and declined 
to permit counsel to proceed to clarify Sellers' position on the 
evidentiary law for the court. Trans, p 11, 11 4-25. 
CONCLUSION 
Buyers' affidavit averred inadmissable hearsay of other 
declarants, absent affiants' personal observation and independant 
knowledge, contrary to URE 802, 801, URCP 56(e) and precedent. 
Buyers are not competent to testify as witnesses as to the truth of 
the seminal "facts" - whether the alleged crack preceded the closing. 
The danger of unfair prejudice is greatly amplified in the instant 
case where the identity of declarants is unstated and the usual 
application of the URE 802 inadmissability standard should be 
enforced. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, 340-341 (1962). 
That the URE be strictly applied pursuant to URCP 56(e) on summary 
judgment is vital since the non-moving party is deprived, of basic due 
process protections integral to a jury trial, like cross-examination, 
to reveal unreliability of out-of-court statements of self-interested 
Buyer/affiants who offer hearsay of other unsworn declarants. 
No discovery was completed, hampering impeachment of declarants. 
This generally precludes summary judgment. Downtown Athletic Club v 
Horman, 740 P2d 275 (Ut App 1987), cert den 765 P2d 1277. 
Genuine issues of material facts in Buyers's affidavit are 
inadmissable and are squarely disputed by Buyers1 
counter-affidavit precluding summary judgment. Pursuant to the 
applicable law cited above summary judment should be reversed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
II 
Typed-in alterations and additional contradictions in Buyers* form 
contract supercede and vitiate pre-printed warranties contained in 
fine print on the back of the contract, rendering the printed terms 
ambiguous and suceptible to construction of the contract against 
Buyers/drafters. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is de novo as set forth in Section I. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
Words inserted in a printed form contract are assumed to take 
precedence over the printed matter. Holland v Brown, 394 P2d 77, 78: 
15 Ut2d 422; 10 ALR3d 449 (Ut 1964)- Words written show the true 
intent of the parties where contradiction arises in a form contract 
and when inconsistency exists between two provisions, the more 
specific provision will qualify over the general provisions. 7 
Ambiguity exists in a contract when the terms may be understood to 
reach two or more plausible meanings, since they are then insufficient 
to express the meanings and intentions of the parties. C.J. Realty v 
Willey, 728 P2d 923 (Ut App 1988). Extrinsic evidence is permissible 
where ambiguity is not reconciled by an objective and reasonable 
interpretation of the contract as a whole, since the court should 
strive to interpret the agreement to harmonize all the provisions. 8 
7. Norman v Recreation Centers, 752 P2d 514 (Ariz App 1988), 
Standley v Standley, 652 P2d 1284, rev den 761 P2d 531. It is well 
settled that a contract will be construed against its drafter. Park 
Enterprises Inc. v New Century Realty, 652 P2d 918, 920 (Ut 1982). 
8. Utah Valley Bank v Tanner, 636 P2d 1060 (Ut 1981), Jones v 
Hinkle, 611 P2d 733 (Ut 1980). 
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Where terms of an agreement are ambiguous, in conflict, or 
unclear, the judge must refrain from interpreting them on a motion for 
summary judgment and the intent of the parties is a jury decision. 
Colonial Leasing v Larsen Bros Constr, 731 P2d 483 (Ut 1986). 
DISCUSSION 
The lower court had before it the Agreement to be construed. The 
alleged warranty in General Provision C, from which Buyers assert the 
furnace warranty arises, is expressly limited in duration to the 
closing. Buyers contend ambiguously that General Provision 0 extends 
warranties beyond the closing for an indeterminate time. Since General 
Provision 0 contradicts the limitation expressd in Provision C, it 
must be construed against Buyers/drafters especially when this 
extension is extrinsic to the contract terms. Trans p 4, 11 2-4. 
Interpreting the limitation expressed in General Provision C 
against Buyers to limit warranties to the date of closing is most 
appropriate, especially since General Provision P only exposes Sellers 
to the risk of loss or damage to the property until closing, when the 
risk passes to Buyers. 
The Buyers' construction of General Provision 0 contradicts the 
"at closing" limitation in General Provision C that must be 
interpreted to mean warranties are expressly limited to, and do not 
extend beyond} the closing unless a warranty in the contract expressly 
manifests the intention of the parties to extend a warranty beyond the 
closing. No condition in the contract expressly extends General 
Provision C waranties beyond the closing. Nor does ambiguous condition 
6 contain an express extension. As held in Colonial Leasing, 
interpretation of the ambiguity in Buyers' Agreement urged on the 
court is a factual dispute reserved for the jury. 
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Sellers, furthermore, offered no warranty to Buyers and made no 
representations at all concerning the fitness of the premises. 
Seller's Affidavit, Averments 1-7. The Agreement 1(e) states: 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of 
the property and subject to Section 1(c) above and 6 below , 
accepts it in its present physical condition , except: as 
outlined in paragraph 7 
Condition 1(e) by its terms does not fairly alert the reader of 
General Provision C which surreptitously negates the acceptance of the 
physical condition upon inspection limitation. Sellers relied on the 
exception, " ... except: as outlined in paragraph 7", as typed into 
condition 1 (e) to exclude the printed reference to condition 6, 
Seller Warranties, that incorporated the fine print of General 
Provision C, that contradicted the additional "as is" terms of General 
Provision B, which referred to warranties outlined in condition 6, in 
which no warranties were expressed and "None" was typed-in, but which 
circuitously referenced printed General Provision C. This contract is 
a quagmire for the layman. 
Holland and Norman cited above hold the specific typed in 
exception is a more accurate manifestation of the intention of the 
parties than the "General Provision" fine print terms on the back. 
Typed in condition 7, specifically typed by reference in condition 
1(e) as the exception to printed condition 6 warranties, "outlines" 
the limitation of Buyers to an inspection of the property to assure 
Buyers accepted its condition. In this way if some defect was found by 
the inspecting Buyers, that Sellers were unaware of while living in 
the house, the price could be negotiated at arms length prior to the 
closing. As written in the counter-offer, the sale price was reduced 
accordingly. (R -p 51 & 53, Agreement.) 
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Logically condition 7 would be redundant surplusage if that typed 
in portion of condition 1(e) did not have the excepting effect on 
warranties that Sellers averred. Without the typed in exception Buyers 
would have the same right referenced in the printed terms of condition 
1(e) to disapprove of the property after the inspection and decline 
the purchase as the right typed in condition 7. Redundancy was not 
intended by the drafter or parties, therefore the exception in 
condition 1(e) is construed to have another meaning. On a motion for 
summary judgment the provision construed to favor the non-moving 
party, was not mere duplication, it was to maintain the risk with 
Buyer after inspection and acceptance and eliminate Sellers' exposure 
to lingering warranties. 
The specific typed in exception prevails as the intent of the 
parties over General Provision C printed on the back, so warranties 
are excepted and Buyers should seek recourse from their inspector on 
whose assurance they relied. The inspector was not joined as a party. 
The Agreement Buyers/drafters presented to Sellers is fraught with 
contradictory, circuitous language that should be construed against 
Buyers, otherwise a layman who wished to sell property solely upon the 
Buyers' acceptance of the fitness of the property would be defeated by 
the convolutions in the contract. Condition 1 (e) turns in on itself 
and is ambiguous, even absent the typed in exception that is effective 
in the instant case. Condition 1(e) states Buyer accepts the property 
in its present physical state upon inspection. Actually this is untrue 
and Buyer isn't accepting the property in its inspected condition. 
Hidden warranties adhere on the back. 
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Ambiguity exists within condition 1(e) itself that gores Seller on 
the horn of the reference to condition 6 in condition 1(e) which 
eviscerates "the acceptance in its present physical condition" terms 
through fine print General Provision C warranties neatly tucked away 
on the reverse side on the page on which condition 1 (e) appears. To 
have notice of General Provision C one must look from condition 1(e) 
to condition 6 which only references General Provision C. Buyer then 
could argue after a purported defect arises that the present physical 
condition was not accepted, although a seller is ambiguously lead to 
believe the "as is" effect of acceptance presented by condition 1 (e). 
A layman would conclude Buyer takes the property as it appears after 
inspection according to the maxim of "caveat emptor." 
In the instant case, condition 1(e) provides that Buyer accepts 
the property in its present physical condition and the specific 
typed-in terms except from the printed terms of condition 1(e) 
subjecting Buyers* acceptance of the property to the warranties in 
condition 6, since the expressed typed-in exceptions "as outlined in 
paragraph 7" negate condition 6. No warranteed features are typed-in 
condition 6. 
According to condition 11, the fine print General Provisions on 
the reverse side of the Agreement are not incorporated if indication 
is contained in the Agreement that such boilerplate is unacceptable. 
Thus the exception to condition 6 specifically and expressly typed in 
condition 1 (e), outlined in typed condition 7, and written in as a 
limitation in the Sellers* counter-offer on page three of the 
Agreement plausabily defeats the incorporation of General Provision C. 
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It is no wonder Buyers waited about thirty-five days after the 
closing to utilize an attorney to create a warranty from the ambiguous 
form contract Buyers presented, but which warranty was not in the 
contemplation of the parties. Seller's Affidavit, Averments 2-7. 
C. J. Realty holds that the plausibilty of the diverse 
interpretations arising from the contradictory terms contained within 
the four corners of the Agreement are ambiguities and they must be 
interpreted against Buyers/drafters at trial. On summary judgment 
construing ambiguities is precluded according to Colonial Leasing. 
CONCLUSION 
Sellers having expressly excepted warranties from Buyers 
acceptance of the physical condition of the property after the 
condition 1(e) inspection and having specifically written a 
counter-offer on page three of the Agreement reiterating the 
limitation to acceptance upon the right to inspection that Buyers 
exercised through their inspector, Sellers are not subjected to 
condition 6 referencing General Provision C warranties that are 
negated according to condition 11. 
Summary judgment predicated on a finding that a warranty existed and 
was effective beyond the closing should be reversed, and resolution of 
ambiguities left to the jury according to Colonial Leasing. 
A warranty was erroneously imposed contrary to the written 
exception in condition 1(e). The alleged warranty was extended beyond 
the closing contrary to the express limitation in General Provision C 
that warranties ended "at closing." Buyers' assertion that General 
Provision 0 extends warranties beyond the closing, is contradictory 
and ambiguous and must be construed against Buyer. 
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The ambiguities within the four corners of Agreement should be 
resolved in favor of the non-moving party, Sellers, and should 
eventually be decided by a jury. Terms were not altered or added by 
Sellers argument below, Sellers merely offered a construction of terms 
existing in the Agreement that must be construed against 
Buyers/drafters and in favor Sellers on a URCP 56 motion. 
Should warranties not be found excepted by condition 1 (e), 
ambiguity about the limitation of the warranties must be construed 
against Buyers/drafters and in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving Sellers as held in Park Realty, C. J. Realty and Colonial 
Leasing cited above. Buyers bear the burden of proving that the 
furnace cracked prior to the closing, and such evidence was 
non-existent as discussed in Section I even if a warranty is found. 
Summary judgment should be reversed to permit the jury to decide 
the genuine issues of fact that are disputed and weigh the effect of 
absence of facts which Buyers have not proven by admissable evidence. 
21 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
III 
Damages awarded for breach of warranty should be assessed in an amount 
to compensate for losses regarding the benefit of the bargain and 
should not be assessed in the full amount of the price of new device. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is de novo as set forth in Section I. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
If a warranty is found and is found to extend beyond the closing, 
contrary to General Provision C, Buyers are entitled only to be placed 
in as good a position as if the contract were performed, or in other 
words be awarded the benefit of the bargain lost consistent with the 
reasonable expectency interest or the bargain within the contemplation 
of the parties when the contract was entered. 9 
Even when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the moving 
party still must satisfy the obligation of proving the amount of 
damages foreseeable to a reasonable person and with reasonable 
certainty. Williams v Barber, 765 P2d 887 (Ut 1988), Dobbs, 
Remedies, p 150. The fact-finder must not engage in speculation or 
guesswork, since damages must be a reasonable estimate based on 
relevant data. Bigelow v RKO, 327 US 251; 66 SCt 574; 90 LEd 652 
(1946) . 
In determining the value of damages, the contracting party 
recovers the amount a willing buyer would pay, or a willing seller 
would accept for the thing before the loss, or more particularly 
regarding the "normal measure of damages" for breach of a warranty -
9. D. Dobbs, Remedies, p 786 (1973); C. McCormick, Handbook on Law 
of Damages, p 561 (1935). 
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the value of the thing as warranteed less the value of the thing 
delivered. D. Dobbs, Remedies, p 144; C. McCormick, Handbook on Law 
of Damages, p 672. This is a factual question for the jury. It is 
inappropriate for the court to weigh evidence of damages since summary 
judgment is limited to legal determinations. 
The contractual maxim that a plaintiff shall not profit more from 
a contractual breach than from its full performance is relevant since 
Buyers erroneously were awarded a new furnace. Patent Scaffolding v 
William Simpson Constr, 256 CalApp 506: 64 Cal Rptr 187,191 (1967). 
Payment from a collateral source should be credited against the 
damages in this contract case, rather than permitting the breach to 
create a windfall. 10 
Damages awarded to the plaintiff must be reduced in a contract 
action when they are mitigated, or when a plaintiff fails to properly 
minimize damages, since plaintiff must avoid or minimize (mitigate) 
losses according to the doctrine of avoidable consequences. John 
Call Engineering v Manti City, 795 P2d 678, 680 (Ut 1990). 
DISCUSSION 
Buyers submitted no admissable or competent evidence below 
regarding the diminution of fair market value of the house measured as 
its price or value with a used furnace in satisfactory working 
condition less the value of the house with a used furnace that was 
purportedly defective. By law the Buyers were only entitled to the 
"normal measure of damages" for breach of a warranty - the value of 
the thing warranteed (a used furnace), less the value as delivered 
10. Hurd v Nelson, 714 P2d 676, 771 (Wy 1986), Grover v Ratcliff, 
586 2d 213, 215 (Ariz App 1978). 
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(a used furnace with a purported defect), not the value of a new 
furnace. Trans p 30, 11 16-25 - p 31, 11 1-11. Assuming the 
purportedly defect furnace had no value as received, the value of the 
thing bargained for was an operational used furnace in a used house 
with no deduction for the existing furnace, however Buyers demanded 
and received a new installed furnace as replacement value. 
Seller's Affidavit swore that he had lived in the house since 1983 
and that it was approximately thirty-three years old. It was not in 
the contemplation of the Seller, nor could it have been the expectency 
interest of the Buyer, that the benefit of the bargain included a new 
furnace. The admission of the agent of the party/opponent, Buyers' 
inspector, about inspection of the used furnace is unrebutted. (R -p 
64 & 46, Sellers' Aff, Averment 17 - Buyers' Aff, Averment 14. 
The lower court engaged in prohibited fact finding in the absence 
of sufficient proof. Trans, p 30, 11 19-25 - p 31, 11 1-11. It 
reasonably should have been inferred that Buyers knew, or should have 
known, the furnace was used. Hence they had no contractual expectency 
interest to the value of a new furnace, but the court awarded Buyers 
the full value of an installed new furnace. Buyers were relieved of 
the obligation to prove not only what was in their contemplation with 
regard to the age of furnace, but also the value of an operational 
used furnace, to establish the "normal measure of damages" with 
reasonable certainty that could be subtracted from the alleged cost of 
a new furnace. 
Buyers' Affidavit, Averment 22 is unlawfully absent a sworn or 
certified paid invoice or cancelled check regarding payment for 
installation of a new furnace. (R -p 47). The referenced bid is 
unsworn and uncertifed by a qualified business custodian and does not 
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meet URE 803(6) requirements necessary to except it as a business 
record from inadmissibility as URE 802 hearsay. (R -p 55). This 
deficiency or lack of foundation violates URCP 56(e) that expressly 
requires sworn or certified copies to assure authenticity, since the 
declarant was out-of-court and not under oath. 
Admissable evidence as to the price of a used furnace compared to 
a new furnace is indispensable to a decision with reasonable certainty 
as to the "normal measure of damages" for breach of warranty -
replacement value of the furnace with one in the condition 
contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was accepted. 
Subtracting from evidence of the price of a new furnace the value of 
an operational used furnace would establish what Buyers should 
contribute if they demand Sellers install a new furnace to satisfy 
Buyers* ulterior interest in additional dependability. (R -p 46, 
Buyers' Aff, Averment 18). Notwithstanding the lack of sufficient 
evidence on which to base a finding of the fair amount of damages with 
reasonable certainty, the lower court capriciously indulged in 
speculation that is strictly prohibited on summary judgment and 
awarded Buyers a windfall exceeding the value of the used furnace for 
which they bargained. Trans, p 31. 
When the court inferred facts from non-existent or hearsay 
documents in favor of the moving party as to Buyers' damages without 
an admissable certified paid receipt or cancelled check, it 
erroneously reversed precedent held in Beehive and Estate 
Landscape that requires such inferences be decided in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party who was deprived of a trial to 
dispute the amount of damages. Trans p 30, 11 16-25 - p 31, 11 1-7. 
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The lower court similarly misplaced its reliance on inadmissable 
hearsay contrary to URCP 56(e) to find as fact that the furnace was 
irreparable and gloss over the award of a new furnace without the 
evidentiary basis necessary to accurately substantiate the Buyers' 
damages with reasonable certainty beyond guesswork. Trans p 30, 11 
23-25 - p 31, 11 1-11. The evidentiary requirements in URCP 56 and the 
URE are not discretionary, but must be applied to proof of damages as 
taught by Williams and Bigelow. Hearsay is URCP 56 inadmissable. 
When plaintiffs fail to submit proofs necessary to accurately 
decide damages the lower court should not reinforce plaintiffs' 
failure by awarding plaintiffs the full value of a new item, since 
relenting to such deficiency is contrary to hornbook law and the 
principles held in Bigelow, Patent Scaffolding and Williams. The 
decision of the lower court is also contrary to URCP 56(e). 
A simple example illustrates the fair determination of damages in 
this case. Buyer buys used skiis with used bindings represented as 
functional. Buyer pays a knowlegeable person to assess the skiis, who 
assures their serviceability. Buyer uses the skiis later and the 
bindings are defective. Buyer refuses Sellers' offer to repair and 
refuses to accept used bindings as a replacement, maintaining such 
remedies will be undependable. Buyer refuses half the price of new 
bindings installed still demanding new bindings. According to 
authority cited above, if Seller could not find used bindings to 
install or Buyer would not accept used bindings as a replacement, the 
Seller should be required to pay the value of used bindings without 
defect as bargained for toward the cost of installing new bindings. 
Seller is not responsible for the total price of new bindings - a 
windfall. 
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The lower court erroneously did not credit against the damages 
awarded the amount Buyers mitigated by recovering the fee from the 
inspector Buyers faulted for indicating the absence of the alleged 
defect in the furnace before the closing. Buyers did not join this 
inspector as a defendant. The windfall of a new furnace that exceeded 
a legitmate expectency of fair compensation was further increased by 
the recovery of the inspection fee. Buyers profited more from the 
breach than from full performance of the contract contrary to Patent 
Scaffolding. Buyers are required to credit the windfall, the amount 
mitigated, to Sellers. (R p- 64, Sellers' Aff, Averment 9. 
Seller's Affidavit swore facts indicating Buyers unreasonably 
exacerbated their damages in violation of the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences held in John Call Engineering. Sellers demonstrated 
receptiveness to satisfaction of Buyers' concerns about other features 
of the house after the closing. (R -p 64, Sellers' Aff, Averments 
13-15). Buyers, however, did not act reasonably to reduce or minimize 
damages. Seller swore Buyers failed to notify Sellers of the alleged 
problem with the furnace, unlike other concerns Buyers raised and had 
resolved, repudiated the opportunity to negotiate a cure and instead 
waited thirty days before communicating their demands through an 
attorney. This unnecessarily maximized expenditures for attorney fees, 
needlessly increasing the damages and immediately putting settlement 
out of reach since Buyers demanded these attorney fees. 
Buyers unfair demand for a new furnace to replace a used one, 
unreasonably promoted the avoidable consequences of litigation. 
Buyers refused the offer to repair and refused replacement with a 
used furnace allegedly based upon unsubstantiated and self-serving 
hearsay that Buyers ascribed to un-named declarants about these 
remedies being unpredictable. (R -p 46, Buyers' Aff, Averment 18). 
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This hearsay allegedly justified Buyers/affiants' intractable demand 
for a windfall - a new furnace. The lower court curtailed Sellers' 
attempt to show Buyers' refusal was umeasonable and increased the 
damages. Such contentiousness precluded Buyers' demand for attorney's 
fee. Trans, p 18, 11 15-25 - p 19, 11 1-19. 
General Provision N permits a reasonable attorney's fee as damages 
to enforce the Agreement or pursue a remedy, not actual attorney's 
fees. Moreover, the doctrine of avoidable consequences and 
reasonability would require that a party, rather than paying for 
attorney fees to obtain the value of a new furnace contrary to the law 
of damages cited above, instead put Seller on notice of the defect and 
negotiate a cure. (R -p 77, Seller's Aff, Ex A-10.) Buyers filing suit 
during negotiations, merely because the Seller notified Buyers' 
attorney that Buyers' agent/inspector had found the furnace in proper 
working condition shortly before the closing, unreasonably increased 
the damages, attorney fees, and put an economical resolution further 
beyond of reach. Such needless haste and unnecessary expense violates 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences and should be discouraged. (R 
-p 66, Seller's Aff, Ex A-l. 
It is Buyers' burden to establish that money for attorney fees was 
"reasonably" spent to procure a remedy that could not have been 
achieved in a more economical fashion and that they acted in a prudent 
fashion to mitigate, rather than exacerbate, the damages. Federal 
Courts, that interpret laws from which a substantial portion of the 
URCP and URE are derived, have extensively interpreted provisions that 
extend the opportunity to recover "reasonable attorney fees" under a 
variety of factual circumstances. 
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Johnson v Georgia Highway Express, 488 F2d 714 (CA5 1974) is the 
seminal holding often cited as establishing those factors to be 
considered in determining whether an attorney's fee is reasonable. The 
eighth factor in Johnson is most significant in this case - 8. the 
amount involved and the results obtained. The lower court alluded to 
this factor when initially noting it was struck that the amount of the 
fees Buyers demanded seemed high in relation to the recovery sought. 
Trans p 30, 11 1-7. 
Buyers claimed erroneously that Sellers were in bad faith, since 
Sellers objected to a $4,000.00 fee in a case that allegedly involved 
only $1,100.00 for a new furnace. Such fees are unreasonable where 
attempting prudent negotiations could have provided a fair remedy more 
economically prior to increasing the damages by hiring an attorney and 
filing suit for a remedy in excess of what the law provides. 
Other Johnson factors which demonstrate that Buyers' damages for 
attorney fees were unreasonable and avoidable consequences are: 
1. time and labor required - Sellers Affidavit and Objection 
shows that services of Buyers' Counsel were unnecessary to obtain a 
fair remedy and also needlessly increased damages as twenty-nine and a 
half hours for a motion for summary judgment is high (R -pp 65 & 119); 
2. the novelty and difficulty of the questions - Buyers admitted 
at the hearing that this was a simple case; Trans, p 1, 11 20-22. 
3. the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly -
Only average skills would be required in a case of this type; 
4. preclusion of other employment - Counsel would be precluded 
from addressing other cases; 
5. customary fee - Buyers' Counsel's 11 December 1991 affidavit 
was devoid as to her customary fee; 
6. whether the fee is fixed or contingent - No indication of the 
terms of the contract with Buyers' Counsel was revealed; 
7. time limitations - Time was not a factor enhancing the fee. 
8. the amount involved and the results obtained - the amount 
recovered in the case was about 25% of the fee demanded; 
9. the ability of the attorneys - average ability was required; 
10. undesireability of the case - not applicable; 
11. attorney/client relationship - not a factor; 
12. awards in similar cases - unknown. 
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Johnson is especially relevant since Sellers offered half the 
price of a new furnace, less the inspection fee Buyers recovered, to 
replace the used furnace for which Plaintiffs bargained, and 
Plaintiffs' attorney fees were self-inflicted by their premature rush 
toward litigation prior to providing notice of the alleged defect or 
informally and economically negotiating a cure between the parties. A 
fairer result could have been achieved without the attorney fees. 
Buyers' unprecedented demand for a new furnace through counsel, 
resort to the expense of an attorney before requesting a cure, and 
rush to the courthouse during negotiations evidence Buyers' 
unreasonable disregard for the doctrine of avoidable consequences and 
mitigation of damages. (R -pp 66-80, Sellers' Aff, Ex A & B). 
Case law cited above precludes an award of a windfall like a new 
furnace that may last thirty years in a house that Buyers knew was an 
existing home with a used furnace, but Buyers unfairly would settle 
for nothing short of a new furnace, attorney fees and the additional 
recovery of the inspection fee, thus unreasonably increasing attorney 
fees, a consequence which could be avoided. 
The Court may view as persuasive authority Federal cases refusing 
to award attorney fees pursuant to legal principles logically 
analogous to those bearing upon General Provision N in this case, that 
is the contractual doctrine of avoidable consequences. Where a 
litigant, like Buyer , refused to first test a potentially more 
economical and no less efficacious method of dispute resolution, like 
promptly communicating with the opposing party before incurring, and 
demanding, needless attorney fees, and instead exacerbate delay and 
increase the expense by litigating first, denial of fees is 
appropriate. Murty v OPM, 707 F2d 815, 816 (CA4 1983). 
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Likewise, when parties to a dispute are progressing toward a 
negotiated resolution although confronted with the prospect of 
exposure to attorney fees, Courts have refused to grant attorney fees 
to a party who refuses to direct a minimal response like a phone call 
to a defendant, to ascertain the accuracy of plaintiff's perception 
that defendant is no longer negotiating toward a resolution, before 
unreasonably filing suit due to a loss of patience. Vermont Low Income 
v Usery, 546 F2d 509f 513-514 (CA2 1976) states: 
But, as every lawyer should know, the fact that a party is 
legally entitled to invoke the aid of the courts does not 
demonstrate that a rush to the courthouse door is always 
reasonable. 
This is exactly the tact Buyers took contrary to the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences. Buyers unreasonably increased their damages by 
expending attorney fees before giving notice of the purported defect 
and attempting to negotiate an amicable cure with Seller and then 
filed suit during negotiations without further contact when Seller 
informed Buyer that Buyers' inspector had found the furnace in average 
working condition before the closing. 
CONCLUSION 
The damages awarded by the lower court were not supported by 
admissable evidence. Affidavits that rely on hearsay are insufficient 
to grant damages on summary disposition according to URCP 56(e) and 
case law. Inferences from facts regarding damages should not have been 
drawn in a light most favorable to the moving party. 
The award of the value of an installed new furnace exceeds the 
benefit of the bargain expected by the parties to the sale of a used 
house and is contrary to law. The doctrine of avoidable consequences 
and mitigation of damages requires Sellers be given credit in the 
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amount of the fee recovered from the inspector against the value of 
the damages. The doctrine of avoidable consequences and mitigation of 
damages requires no damages for attorney fees be awarded Buyers who 
unreasonably demanded the value of a new furnace, unreasonably 
increased damages for attorney fees before notifying Sellers of the 
purported problem and then demanded the recovery of those attorney 
fees, unreasonably filed suit during negotiations, and unreasonably 
refused the offers of reasonable remedies because Buyers had increased 
their damages for attorney fees and would settle for nothing less than 
a new furnace. 
The lower court must refrain from deciding issues of fact on 
summary judgment and the jury should be allowed to determine the 
genuine issues of unproven and disputed facts regarding damages at 
trial. The judment below should be reversed. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
IV 
Sellers' Counsel should not punished or found in bad faith for 
asserting Sellers' right to object to Buyers' attorney's fees as 
unreasonable for services that did not advance the progress of Buyers' 
case toward a remedy, or which were in excess of a reasonable amount 
of time necessary to provide services for the amount in dispute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The punishment of an attorney by the lower court under URCP 11 is a 
question of law and the standard of review applied is de novo with no 
deference to the conclusions of the lower court. 11 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
THE LAW 
URCP 11 states in pertinent part: 
...The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by 
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well founded in fact 
and warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as 
to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation ... If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose on the person 
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper 
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Emphasis Added. 
URCP 11 virtually mirrors FRCP 11. Clark v Booth, 168 Ut Adv Rep 7, 
9 (1991). Federal cases construing FRCP 11 are analogous to URCP 11 
and are persuasive authority. Gaiardo v Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479; 
95 ALR Fed 93 (CA3) holds failure to prevail in the law suit does not 
trigger a sanction against an attorney under Rule 11 and advancing 
new or novel legal arguments is not punishable under Rule 11 after 
reasonable legal research and adequate factual investigation. 
11. Taylor v Estate of Taylor, 770 P2D 163 (Ut App 1989), Smith v 
Smith, 793 P2d 407, 409 (Ut App 1990). 
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The Gaiardo Court also held it would chill effective advocacy 
and run directly against the language and intent of Rule 11 to punish 
an attorney under circumstances where the legal principle advanced was 
not frivolous. 
Rule 11 merely requires an attorney make a reasonable inquiry as 
to the facts and law before signing and filing a document and when the 
attorney believed the issue was well founded as the document was filed 
he or she should not be punished. Where an opposing party concedes 
that a document at the time of filing did not violate Rule 11, 
sanctions are improper. Jeschke v Willis 811 P2d 202 (Ut App 1991). 
DISCUSSION 
The holdings in Federal case law like Johnson set forth factors 
which demonstrate that Sellers' objections to Buyers' attorney fees 
for unreasonability are well grounded in the law, are maintained in 
good faith, and are not in any manner harassment, frivolous, or 
violative of Rule 11 or 78-27-56. 
That Sellers' Objection to the unreasonability of the fees demanded by 
Buyers was brought in good faith is further strengthened, since even 
the district court in its initial opinion on the reasonability of 
Buyers' attorney fees stated it was "struck by the high amount given 
the amount that is in dispute." Trans p 30, 11 1-13. This is the 
eighth factor the Johnson court applied in determining the 
appropriateness of fees, as cited to the lower court by Sellers. The 
lower court also commented that Sellers could object to those high 
fees, however, when Sellers accepted the offer to object Counsel was 
punished. Clearly Counsel's objection to Buyers* unnecessary and 
"high" attorney fees is well grounded in the existing facts and legal 
principles, especially where Buyers demanded a remedy that was unfair 
and unsupported by the law of damages. 
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Nonetheless, Sellers1 Counsel was punished by a Two Hundred 
($200*00) Dollar sanction under URCP 11, generally for advocating a 
public policy argument based on the contractual doctrine of avoidable 
consequences and mitigation of damages as it applies to the 
over-crowding of the courts by contentious litigants, like Buyers, who 
unreasonably refuse to negotiate their demands with the opposite 
parties before hiring attorneys and "rushing to the courthouse" to 
file suit for a remedy in excess of what the law sets as fair* 
Sellers were given no alternative but to resist Buyers' immediate 
demand for damages that were excessive according to the facts and law 
and to resist Buyers' demand for unreasonable attorney fees,or relent 
and be exploited. Counsel should not be punished for zealously 
defending his clients from the imposition of windfall damages that are 
contrary to well-settled hornbook law that precludes a remedy in 
excess of the benefit for which Buyers bargained. 
Sellers argument for the extension of principles well grounded in 
existing law, the doctrine of avoidable consequenses, Johnson, and 
the intent of URCP 11, is relevant to the facts of this case and is 
not frivolous. Sellers' resistence to fees Buyers unreasonably 
promoted is a good faith legal argument for the advancement of public 
policy that is important to the jurisprudence of the State of Utah. It 
is not an ethereal aberration invented by Buyers" Counsel for an 
improper purpose or harassment but is a legitimate concern expressed 
in hornbook law and in cases like Murty and Vermont Low Income, as 
cited in the previous section, where reasonable courts have enforced a 
growing disenchantment with litigants who refuse to take the 
reasonable approach to informal alternative dispute resolution and 
instead prematurely clutter the court with litigation when 
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communication with the opposite party could have the potential of 
avoiding the intervention of the courts thereby promoting judicial 
economy and decreased expense. 
Jeschke, cited above, holds that sanctions are improper where 
the opposing party admits the document itself was not in violation of 
URCP 11 when signed. Buyers' Reply to Sellers1 Response to Sanctions 
concedes that Sellers have the right to submit documents to cause 
review of and to question the attorney fees claimed by Buyers. (R -p 
133). However, Buyers assert their dissatisfaction with part of 
Sellers' Response erroneously claiming Sellers' argument that Buyers' 
attorney's fees are unreasonable is relitigation. Sellers state the 
matter could have been resolved more expeditiously and economically 
had Buyers' concern been noticed to the Sellers before exacerbating 
the damages by spending money for an attorney and demanding excessive 
damages contrary to law, a new furnace. (R -pp 79-80). 
The issue of reasonability was relevant both during the hearing 
for the motion of summary judgment, or liability phase, and during 
opposition to the unreasonability of the attorney fees, or 
determination of damages phase, and is not punishable relitigation of 
the same issue. The alternative was endure Buyers running roughshod 
over Sellers' right to protest fees that even the lower court 
initially denominated as high and stand idly by without defending. 
That Buyers' Objection was grounded in fact and law and was not 
frivolous is especially true since the court declined to hear the 
reasonability issue during the URCP 56 motion. Trans p 19, 11 1-19. 
There is a URCP 11 factual basis for Seller's claim that Buyers' 
contentiousness put settlement of this matter beyond resolution from 
the onset, increasing attorney fees contrary to the doctrine of 
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avoidable consequences, while Buyers sought to shift the results of 
their contentiousness and intractability to the Sellers. 
Sellers objected to attorney fees demanded in the Affidavit of 
Buyers' attorney and Statement of Attorney Fees, for services on 
10/23/91, 10/24/91, 10/28/91 to contact Mountain Fuel and its counsel 
for an affidavit that was not obtained. Sellers objected since the 
services produced nothing toward a positive result in the case. 
Sellers pointed out that the denial of the affidavit accounted for 
Buyers' attempt to introduce hearsay in their affidavit as an 
inadmissable alternative. (R -p 45, Buyers' Aff, Averment 12). This 
comment and objection was strictly relevant and in no way frivolous. 
Johnson relevantly teaches that the failure to obtain an affidavit 
from Mt. Fuel should not be assessed against Defendants since such 
services added nothing to the progress of the case or result but 
expense. Defendants are in good faith when protesting non-productive 
fees pursuant to Johnson, especially since this objection is well 
grounded in facts below, that is in Buyers' Statement (R p- 111). 
Johnson's factor eight substantiates Sellers' good faith, if not 
absolute, right to object to an excessive fee that produces a modest 
recovery. It is not bad faith or harassment under URCP 11 to object to 
that which the law deems improper or unjust, especially when 
established legal principles cited previously provide a logical and 
legal basis for such objections, if the lower court's own statement 
that it was struck that the fees seemed high is not enough to rely on 
in factually grounding Seller's opposition to such "high" fees. 
Demanding fees for twenty-nine and one half hours to complete a 
motion for summary judgment in a "simple" case is excessive. Buyers' 
attorney fees should be denied to avoid reinforcing parties who 
37 
unreasonably rush to the courthouse to sue first, contentiously 
instigating and demanding attorney fees that put settlement out of 
reach, rather than economically communicating with the other party to 
negotiate a "reasonable" resolution before introducing attorneys and 
seeking the intervention of the courts to decide the situation. In 
this case Buyers' immediate introduction of an attorney into the 
problem and subsequent unfair demand for a new furnace exacerbated the 
damages for attorney fees contrary to the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences which requires reasonability. 
CONCLUSION 
The precedent the Buyers wish to set is that a party to the form 
contract, upon development of a purported defect after closing, can 
immediately hire an attorney, demand a remedy in excess of what the 
law of damages provides and thereby unreasonably increase the damages 
if the Seller does not immediately give-up and pay without protest. 
Should Sellers oppose this abuse and object to the fees instigated by 
Buyers' unreasonableness, Sellers' counsel is punished. 
Punishing Sellers' Counsel for his reliance on well grounded 
principles of law like the doctrine of mitigation or avoidable 
consequences, Johnson, Vermont Low Income, Murty, etc. in opposing 
attorney fees that even the court initially stated seemed "strikingly 
high" is contrary to the terms of Rule 11 as held in Gaiardo, 
The district court erroneously sanctioned Sellers' Counsel merely 
for exercising a right to object that the lower court itself 
recognized as legally available when it earlier stated the fees seemed 
strikingly "high." Later the court vacillated concluding erroneously 
that Sellers' objection to the unreasonability of the fees was in bad 
faith, was meritless, and was an attempt to relitigate. 
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The argument Sellers sought to advance in good faith as public 
policy is that litigants who do not communicate with the opposite 
party before increasing damages should not be encouraged by an award 
of unreasonable attorney fees that would not have accrued but for 
Buyers taking a contentious, rather than a more reasonable and 
communicative approach. Trans p 19, 11 13-19. Sellers are not 
proscribed by URCP 11 from attempting to advance existing law that is 
important to the jurisprudence of Utah according to Gaiardo. 
The punishment of Sellers' counsel should be reversed as contrary 
to the express terms of URCP 11 and cases construing that rule. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons contained in the Conclusions set forth above, 
Sellers seek an order reversing the grant of summary judgment, 
damages, attorneys fees and sanctions. Sellers seek remand, the grant 
of the right to discovery and the protections of a trial by jury. 
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